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Following the May 2003 Canadian BSE case, food safety issues have become even more 
prominent to policymakers and consumers. In both Canada and the US, governments and 
industry have responded with a variety of quality assurance, traceability and labeling 
schemes. However, there is little information available on the extent to which consumer 
perceptions differ regionally across North America towards labeling schemes. This paper 
attempts to fill this gap, by providing results on a variety of beef labeling strategies from 
choice experiments that were conducted in Alberta (Canada) and Montana (US). The 
analysis focuses on consumers' perceptions towards negative voluntary labeling with 
regard to BSE testing, genetically modified organisms (GMO) and the use of growth 
hormones in beef production. We find that four years after the first BSE case emerged in 
North America, consumers are willing to pay most to avoid risks associated with BSE. 
Montana and Alberta consumers are found not to be significantly heterogeneous in their 
preferences. 
Keywords: Choice experiments; Multinomial logit; Beef labeling 
JEL Classification: D12, L66, C35  
Introduction and Background 
    
In the course of the May 2003 Canadian BSE case, trade and food safety issues 
received top priority on the policy agenda on either side of the border. In Montana, the 
fifth largest beef producing region in the US, beef producers had lobbied for a sustained 
border closure with Canada that lasted until August 2005, two months after the first BSE 
case of US origin had emerged. Alberta's beef producers, which produced 72% of 
Canada's beef in 2003, were most significantly affected among all of the Canadian 
provinces by these trade restrictions. However, per capita beef consumption declined 
much less in Canada after May of 2003 than in Europe after March 1996, when scientists 
had first established a possible link between BSE and variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease
1. 
Following the 2003 BSE cow, annual beef per-capita consumption declined in 2004 in 
both the US and Canada, yet it rebounded in both countries to levels exceeding the pre-
BSE consumption levels in 2006 (Statistics Canada (2006); Figure 1, p.16).  
However, despite similar aggregate consumption patterns across borders (Figure 
1), we have little information on how consumer perceptions differ towards beef, and 
more specifically towards beef labeling strategies, across the US and Canada. This paper 
focuses on three labeling provisions with regard to growth hormones, genetically 
modified (GM) organisms and BSE testing. There are several reasons why this paper 
concentrates labeling issues. Following the recent BSE incidences in the North American 
meat sector, it is likely that consumer trust in private and public suppliers of labeling 
information has changed significantly compared to the situation prior to 2003 (deJonge, 
Frewer, vanTrijp, Renes, deWit, and Timmers 2004). Further, the difficulties for private 
firms to recoup food-safety related investments is likely to have increased, since an 
increasingly complex food demand chain opens the door for further market failures in 
cases where food hazards can enter the food chain at multiple points. As a result, 
government regulation is likely to have an increasing role in the future in mitigating 
market failures through labeling and through public quality assurance by regulating 
labeling (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). This role for government regulation can also be 
                                                 
1 According to consumer surveys between March to May 1996, consumers reduced their beef consumption 
by 70%, as compared to the week prior to March 26. A month later, beef consumption was still down by 30 
to 50% (Southey 1996). 
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put forward for origin labeling and mandatory labeling for GM content (Umberger, Feuz, 
Calkins, and Sitz (2003), Unnevehr and Hasler (2000)).
2 
However, considering the aim of the present paper in pursuing a comparative 
analysis that focuses on labeling attributes, it is important to recognize that in response to 
past food safety crises and differences in consumers' food safety concerns, governments 
and industry in the US and Canada have responded with different quality assurance 
schemes and labeling regulations (Hobbs, Fearne, and Spriggs (2002); Roberts and 
Unnevehr (2003)). Voluntary labeling of beef from cattle administered growth hormones 
has long been practiced in the US, yet we have evidence that consumers are both critical 
as well as unaware of their use (Lusk and Fox 2002).
3 With regard to labeling regulations 
for foods with genetically modified (GM) content, there are only minor differences 
between the US and Canada. Both countries have not implemented mandatory labeling 
for foods with GM contents, and in both countries, food labels are only required to carry 
information about 
GM contents in cases where genetic modification significantly alters the 
properties of the food (Teisl and Caswell (2003), Roe and Teisl (2007)). Whereas US 
consumers have been able to buy food products that are guaranteed to not contain GM 
ingredients based on a nationwide standard (USDA certified organic), this has not been 
the case in Canada. Largely due to the pressure of the European Union's import 
regulations, Canada has only now (December 2007) implemented a nationwide standard 
for organic produce, which also contains a guarantee for the absence of GM contents in 
organic produce. 
Labeling for BSE testing is also a contentious issue, not at least since March 26, 
2007, when the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the USDA does 
not have authority to regulate testing for BSE. However, since this ruling was repealed by 
USDA, it has not entered the current Farm Bill.  
                                                 
2 The regulation of health claims in both the US and Canada is also done under the premise of improving 
the market for nutritional qualities (Unnevehr and Hasler 2000). 
3 Nutritional labeling has also a long history in the US. The US government has made nutrition labeling 
(nutrition information panels) mandatory since 1994 (Caswell 1997). In contrast, nutrition labeling in 
Canada became only mandatory for most prepackaged foods as of December 2005 (Statistics Canada 
2007b). Smaller businesses have until December 12, 2007, to make nutrition information available 
(Statistics Canada 2007b). 
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Furthermore, the stringency of enforcing those regulations may differ between 
countries (Mitchell 2003), generating differences in consumer trust in public and private 
labeling efforts. In sum, as a variety of different factors impede on consumers' trust in 
governmental and non-governmental information providers, we expect to find differences 
in consumers' willingness to pay for labeling attributes across countries (Priest, 
Bonfadelli, and Rusanen (2003); Baker (2003)). 
Objectives and Previous Work 
Given the diversity of labeling approaches, Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003) suggest 
to categorize labels along four dimensions: the entity on whose behalf they signal (a 
single firm or a group); the information content of the label; the mechanism of 
accreditation (an independent organization or government); and the degree of government 
involvement (mandatory enforcement vs. voluntary industry compliance). In this paper, 
we abstract from both the entity on whose behalf the label signals, and the mechanism of 
accreditation. The analysis focuses on voluntary negative labeling: the guarantee that beef 
is tested for BSE, the guarantee that it is raised without growth hormones and antibiotics, 
and the guarantee that it is produced without GMO's. 
Most recently, negative GM labeling was found to be more valued by US 
consumers than positive GM labeling. Roe and Teisl (2007) used a survey to show that 
simple claims of No-GM content are viewed by consumers as most adequate in terms of 
the information provided to make an informed decision. Roe et al. (2007) also show that 
a No-GM label that is certified by the FDA and includes contact information is perceived 
by consumers as most credible and adequate. 
Consumers' perceptions toward other beef labeling attributes have been explored 
through a number of stated and revealed preference analyses. Hobbs, Bailey, Dickinson, 
and Haghiri (2005) conducted experimental auctions in 2002 to assess Canadian 
consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for traceability assurance, food safety assurance 
and on-farm production methods assurance for beef and pork products. Their key finding 
that simple traceability assurance in the absence of quality assurances related to food 
safety is valued less by consumers, is stronger for beef than for pork, and is also 
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consistent with results obtained from an earlier experimental auction-based study in the 
US (Dickinson and Bailey 2002). Other studies have contrasted consumers' perceptions 
for beef versus bison. In an auction-based study which was conducted prior to the May 
2003 BSE case (in 2002) and that encompassed five locations across Canada, Hobbs, 
Sanderson, and Haghiri (2006) evaluate Canadian consumers' willingness-to-pay for 
bison versus beef. Using beef and bison sandwiches as part of the experimental design, 
the study's results suggest that there was no statistically significant higher willingness-to-
pay for bison sandwiches over beef sandwiches, either with or without the additional 
quality assurances. 
We are aware of only one earlier Canadian study related to beef labeling and 
quality assurances. In 1996, Quagrainie, Unterschultz, and Veeman (1998) conducted 
choice experiments among Canadian consumers for origin labeling (beef and pork) and 
biopreservatives in packaging. While the study establishes a significant price premium 
for Canadian over US beef, it finds that Canadian consumers view biopreservatives 
negatively in packaging. 
Our study is related to two other choice-experiment-based studies. Tonsor, 
Schroeder, Fox, and Biere (2005) conducted three choice experiments in 2002 in London, 
Frankfurt, and Paris, to analyze how consumers value beef steaks with attributes 
including “GM-free”, farm-specific source verification, and domestic origin. This study 
finds that consumers are significantly heterogeneous across regions in their preferences 
for beef steak attributes. Lusk and Schroeder (2004) conducted choice experiments in 
2002 in the US, in order to test for hypothetical bias in consumers' valuation of beef steak 
attributes, including steaks that were “guaranteed natural”. The marginal WTP for steak 
attributes was found to be equivalent in both the hypothetical and real settings, where 
consumers where given the option to actually purchase steaks. However, purchasing 
propensities were found to be higher in the hypothetical setting, compared to the non-
hypothetical setting. 
Our study is also related to an analysis of beef labeling strategies in Europe. 
Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003) conducted mail-back surveys based on referendum design 
with follow-up in 2000 in France, Germany, and the UK to analyze consumers' WTP for 
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alternative beef labeling strategies. Their analysis focuses on brands, origin labels, and 
mandatory labeling of beef from cattle fed genetically modified feed. Consumers were 
asked to state their preferences for a brand that signals on behalf of an individual firm 
(not accredited by a third party nor by government), for a product origin label (producers 
belonging to a regional collective), and for a mandatory GM label (beef fed GM crops, 
certified by a government agency). The study results suggest that European consumers 
have high concerns over GM foods, as more than 90% of surveyed consumers wanted a 
mandatory labeling program for beef produced from cattle fed genetically modified 
crops. 
Our study differs from the above in several ways. First, this is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first comparative US-Canada study that analyzes consumers' valuation for 
beef labeling attributes. Second, our study also seems to be the first study to explore 
North American consumers' willingness-to-pay for BSE testing. Third, it is to the best of 
our knowledge also the first choice-experiment based study in North America focusing 
on beef labeling, in which the survey was conducted after the May 2003 Canadian BSE 
case. It provides thus a useful comparison to the results from previous studies that have 
explored labeling issues and consumers' GMO perceptions in the North American context 
(Hobbs, Bailey, Dickinson, and Haghiri (2005); Tonsor, Schroeder, Fox, and Biere 
(2005); Quagrainie, Unterschultz, and Veeman (1998)). Fourth, in contrast to previous 
choice-experiment based studies on beef (Quagrainie, Unterschultz, and Veeman (1998), 
Tonsor, Schroeder, Fox, and Biere (2005)), consumers in our study were first asked to 
identify their regular beef steak in terms of multiple attributes and attribute levels. This 
information was then used in the following choice experiment as consumers' status quo, 
such they were asked to trade off their status quo with alternative beef attribute 
combinations. In this way, we expect that consumers' trade-off decisions are close to 
trade-offs in the marketplace, since consumers are asked to compare less familiar steak 
options with a beef steak option that is close to their individual preference structure. 
Further, in contrast to previous choice-experiment based studies on beef labeling (Alfnes 
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(2004), Enneking (2004)), our study includes an opt-out option and tests for a restricted 
choice set.
4 
The remainder of the paper is structured as following. In section (3) we describe 
data collection and experimental design. Section (4) presents the econometric approach 
and the estimation results, and conclusions are presented in section (5). 
Data and Experimental Design 
Our analysis builds on two web-based surveys that were conducted during the 
same time period (April 2006) in Montana (US) and Alberta (Canada). The survey 
development was initiated by focus group research using Alberta consumers only, 
whereby two rounds of focus group discussions were facilitated with 8 to 10 consumers 
each. The focus group research was used to identify the key attributes and attribute levels 
for beef steaks, as well as to gain feedback on the web-format of the survey. Consumers 
for the first two focus groups were recruited from the student population of the University 
of Alberta. An international marketing firm was then commissioned to use random digital 
dialing (RDD) to recruit Alberta consumers for two additional focus groups. Then, the 
revised web-based survey was further tested by 8 individuals (members of the 
administrative, academic staff and graduate students). The survey was finally put live in 
the following manner: consumers were first contacted via phone and offered a $5 voucher 
upon participation; non-respondents received reminder emails and one reminder phone 
call. Following this procedure, the marketing firm first recruited 12 Alberta consumers 
via RDD and then stopped, so that final adjustments to the survey design could be 
performed. After these steps, the international marketing firm used RDD to recruit a total 
of 214 consumers from Montana, and another 205 consumers from Alberta. 
The survey consisted of three parts. First, consumers were asked several rating 
and ranking questions that related to beef steak attributes, consumption behavior of 
organic foods and the information sources that consumers rely on when it comes to 
                                                 
4 Choice experiments frequently include opt-out options, as it allows the analyst to consistently estimate the 
total WTP for specific attribute combinations (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait (2000), Bennett and 
Adamowicz (2001), Bateman, Carson, Day, Hanemann, Hanley, Hett, Jones-Lee, Loomes, Mourato, 
Ozdemiroglu, Pearce, Sugden, and Swanson (2004). 
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labeling and food safety issues. In one question, consumers were asked to rank their 
information sources, specifically:  
“What type of media do you rely on as a source of information on food-safety related 
issues (food poisoning, BSE, genetically modified organisms).” 
Table 1. Ranking counts of information sources 
  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Rank4  Rank5  Rank6  Rank7 
Magazines & 
Newspapers 
126 102 46 39 0  44 62 
TV & Radio  120 118 68 38 2  33 40 




44  61 50 136  3  63 62 
Telephone 
helpline 
37 40 74 78 55 72 63 
Health 
professionals 
17  25 58 45 97 113  64 
Labels on 
package 
4 9 17  9 254  47 79 
As Table 1 indicates, consumers mainly rely on print media followed by TV/radio 
as their primary sources of information on food-safety related issues. Considering 
information sources that were ranked as first and second sources, family, friends and 
work colleagues appear not even half as important as the above media sources. Somewhat 
surprisingly, health professionals are considered relatively unimportant sources of 
information. Not surprisingly, and in fact indirectly confirming that consumers 
understood the question and the typical information content of labels, is the fact that 
labels on packages were ranked least important as a source of information on food-safety 
related issues. 
This rating and ranking part of the survey was followed by a choice-based 
experiment, which in turn was followed by questions on demographics. Before 
consumers proceeded to the choice experiment, they were asked to specify their regular 
beef steak purchase. This beef steak became their status quo in the following choice 
experiment, and was characterized in terms of four steak attributes. First, consumers 
could choose between four prices for their beef steak purchase. Second, they could 
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choose a beef label that carried a guarantee for BSE testing. Third, consumers could 
choose a label that carried a guarantee for absence of growth hormones. Fourth, 
consumers could choose beef steaks that were labeled as “Guaranteed produced without 
genetically modified organisms (GMO)”. Once consumers had selected their regular beef 
steak purchase, they proceeded to a repeated choice experiment. This consisted of four 
tables (four separate web-pages), in each of which they could choose one of three options 
at varying attribute levels (choice A: their regular beef steak; choice B: a specified beef 
steak; choice C: neither). For such a given set of four treatments, the treatment order was 
randomized. The individual respondents were also randomly assigned to a given set of 
treatments. In order to analyze the role of the status quo (consumers' regular beef steak), 
we also specified a restricted choice set, in which the status quo was no longer available. 
For the choice experiment, we specified an orthogonal main-effects only design 
(Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). To reduce the number of treatment combinations, 
we used fractional factorial design and generated the experimental orthogonal design in 
SPSS. 
Econometric Model and Results 
For an analysis of consumers' unordered responses in the above choice 
experiments, we assume that consumers follow the standard assumptions of random 
utility theory. We further assume that an individual 's utility for alternativei can be 
written as: 
n
ni ni ni V U ε + =          ( 1 )  
where the utility of an alternative consists of a deterministic component  V  (the beef 
steak attributes), and a random error term ε (unobservables and measurement error). The 
probability that individual n chooses alternative i from a choice set of alternatives  , 
can then be expressed 
J
as: 
) , ( ) , ( J j i V V P J j i U U P P nj ni ni nj nj ni ni ∈ ≠ ∀ − + > = ∈ ≠ ∀ > = ε ε      (2) 
We further assume that the random error terms follow an extreme value Type I 
distribution, and that they are independently and identically distributed across 
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alternatives. The choice probabilities in equation (2) can then be expressed as a 















        ( 3 )  
The deterministic part of the utility function is assumed to be linear in parameters, 
,  ni
T
ni X V μβ = μ denotes a scale parameter of utilities normalized to μ  = 1, and   is a 
parameter vector associated with the vector of explanatory variables  . Therefore, the 
steak attributes (price, GMO, Growth hormones, BSE test) enter the consumer's utility 
function through  . Interaction terms between socio-economic characteristics and the 
alternative-specific constants (as well as other attributes) were included to allow for 





Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample population in both Alberta and 
Montana.
6 
                                                 
5 A mixed logit model (Train 2002) was estimated, but did not converge. We used Limdep 8.0 and NLogit 
3.0.1 for estimation. 
6 Consumers were asked to what extent they consider themselves to be red meat or white meat eaters (faced 
with a sliding scale of percentage distributions). Respondents were asked whether they would consider their 
roots to be rural or urban, which is reflected in ‘urban’/ ‘rural’, below. Ethnic background is shown to 
document the diversity between Alberta and Montana, yet it is acknowledged that the perceptions of what 
constitutes, e.g. “European” is likely to vary significantly across the regions. 
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Male (%)  38  42 
Female (%)  62  58 
Average age (years)  45  49 
White meat eaters (40%red / 60% white or more white) %  30.55  25.48 
Red meat eaters (60%red / 40% white or more red) %   44.15  53.37 
Urban (%)  43.91  31.25 
Rural (%)  56.09  68.75 
Smokers (%)  13.84  12.02 
Ethnic background:     
Asian 3%  <1% 
British Isles  16.5%  21% 
Central / South American  2%  <1% 
European 30.5%  45.2% 
Family income in 2005 after tax (%):     
Less than $50000 (Can/US dollar, respectively)  40.81  50 
$50,000-$100,000 (Can/US dollar, respectively)  41.05  36.54 
More than $100,000 (Can/US dollar, respectively)  18.14  13.46 
Lived for less than 10 years in Can/US, respectively (%)  53.22  99.04 
Married (%)  68.74  69.71 
Table 3 shows the procedure that was followed for the model selection. We used 
likelihood ratio-tests to choose between models. Models for the restricted choice sets, 
where consumers had no longer their regular steak available, were included in our 
estimation procedure. Based on this model selection procedure, model (3) was selected as 
final model specification: since the -2LL value (46.65) is smaller than the critical Chi-
square value (55.76), the model with all interaction terms is inferior; similarly, comparing 
the LL of the pooled model (A,B,C pooled with restricted choice set B,C) with the 
likelihoods from the two separate models (unrestricted choice set model and restricted 
choice set model), the pooled model is rejected since 186.05 exceeds the critical Chi-
square value (the base model is the unrestricted choice model (A,B,C) with reduced 
interaction terms). 
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LR ratio test model (5): LR=-2LL([(3)+(4)]-(5))=186.0524; Chi-aq (36)=51 
 
The results for model (3) are presented in Table (4). 
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Table 4. Estimation results for model (3) 
VARIABLES PARAMETERS   
(standard errors) 
Choice A  4.5368*** (0.225) 
Choice B  3.5554*** (0.2386) 
Price  -0.1284 *** (0.0206)
BSE test guarantee  0.2735* (0.1521) 
GMO guarantee  0.3045 (0.2009) 
Guaranteed free of growth hormones  0.2295 (0.1815) 
ChoiceA x Male  0.573*** (0.2186) 
ChoiceB x Male  0.2242 (0.2338) 
White Meat eater × Price   0.016** (0.0075) 
Even white/red meat eater × Price  -0.0083 (0.0061) 
Male × Price   -0.0101 (0.0112) 
Age < 20 × Price   0.0267 (0.034) 
20≤age<50 × Price   0.0089 (0.0178) 
Edu less college × Price   -0.0025 (0.0052) 
Regular smoker × Price   -0.0111* (0.0065) 
< 5 years in Can(US) × Price   -0.0148*** (0.0048) 
White meat preferred × Guaranteed BSE test   0.1649** (0.0789) 
Even white/red meat eater × Guaranteed BSE test  0.0066 (0.0638) 
Male × Guaranteed BSE test   0.1* (0.0513) 
Age < 20 × Guaranteed BSE test   -0.2087 (0.2742) 
20≤age<50 × Guaranteed BSE test   0.1986 (0.1471) 
Education below college × Guaranteed BSE test   0.1604*** (0.0571) 
Regular smoker × Guaranteed BSE test   -0.2675*** (0.0723) 
< 5 years in Can(US) × Guaranteed BSE test   0.0015 (0.0492) 
White meat preferred × Guaranteed free of GMO   0.1699** (0.0824) 
Even white/red meat eater × Guaranteed free of GMO   -0.0055 (0.0685) 
Even white/red meat eater × Guaranteed free of GMO   -0.0055 (0.0685) 
Male × Guaranteed free of GMO   0.0619 (0.056) 
Age < 20 × Guarantee free of GMO   -0.2338 (0.3758) 
20≤age<50 × Guarantee free of GMO   0.1226 (0.1958) 
Education below college × Guaranteed free of GMO   -0.0896 (0.061) 
Regular smoker × Guaranteed free of GMO   0.1784** (0.0789) 
< 5 years in Can(US) × Guaranteed free of GMO   0.0488 (0.0536) 
White meat preferred × Guaranteed free of growth hormones   0.1226 (0.0808) 
Even white/red meat eater × Guaranteed free of growth hormones  -0.0122 (0.0665) 
Male × Guaranteed free of hormone   -0.1143** (0.054) 
Age<20 × Guaranteed free of hormones   -0.525 (0.3373) 
20≤age<50 × Guarantee free of growth hormones   0.2555 (0.1779) 
Education below college × Guaranteed free of growth hormones   0.1837*** (0.059) 
Regular smoker × Guaranteed free of hormone   0.0016 (0.0743) 
R square adjusted   .3564 
LogLikelihood at convergence   -1170.8378 
Number of observations   419 
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In order to test for differences between Canadian and US consumers' preferences, 
we used models with and without interaction terms between the design variables (and the 
alternative specific constants) and the regional dummies, as a basis for a likelihood ratio 
test. The test statistics suggest that perceptions of Alberta and Montana consumers are not 
significantly different. This is not unexpected, since Alberta and Montana share not only 
the same border, but beef consumption and production is important in both of these 
regions (Lawrence and Otto (2003); Davis and Lin (2005b); TheDaily (2004); Su 
(2006)). 
Given the inability to statistically differentiate consumer preferences in Alberta 
from those of Montana, the results in table 4 are based on a pooled data set (n= 419).
7 
The results suggest that when consumers are given the option to value the above labeling 
attributes in a beef steak, namely (i) beef that is guaranteed produced without genetically 
modified organisms (GM guarantee), (ii) beef that is guaranteed raised without growth 
hormones (hormone guarantee) and (iii) beef that is guaranteed tested for BSE, the latter 
was valued most irrespective of the country of origin of the consumer. The strongly 
significant coefficient estimate for choice A suggests that consumers have, as expected, 
as strong preference for their status quo beef steak. Further, the estimation results suggest 
that risks associated with BSE appear to be less of concern to more educated consumers, 
whereas risks associated with GMO's appear to be more of concern to more educated 
consumers. Thus, in line with Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003), we find that consumers are 
concerned about the indirect consumption of genetically modified organisms, i.e. the use 
of GM feed in beef production. Further, female consumers show a lower marginal utility 
with regards to BSE testing and with regards to the GM guarantee than male consumers. 
Regular smokers appear to value BSE testing less than nonsmokers, yet this result is 
reversed for the GM guarantee. We also differentiated consumers in terms of white vs. 
red meat eaters, and, as expected, white meat eaters show a higher marginal utility for all 
three labeling attributes, compared to red meat eaters. 
                                                 
7 The *,**,*** denote signi_cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Since we were also interested in welfare measures, we computed the marginal 
WTP (MWTP) for attributes based on the unrestricted model (A,B,C) with reduced 





=      (4) 
where the negative marginal utility of price is the marginal utility of money ( ), and 
denotes the marginal utility of 
MUM
j MU j th attribute. The marginal utility of price was 
allowed to vary across individuals, since interaction terms between price and socio-
economic variables were included in the model. Although an average consumer could be 
used to calculate the marginal WTP, due to the likely non-linear nature of the MWTP 
function, we calculated the individual MWTP's and then derived the average MWTP for 
specific attributes.  
As a second welfare measure, we followed Freeman (1993) to obtain 
compensating variation measures (CV) for various attributes, 
)) ( ) ( ( *
1 0 1




v i i e Log e Log
MUM
CV       (5) 
Table (5) displays both of the above welfare measures. 
Table 5. Welfare measures 
 MWTP 
 
MWTP  MWTP  CV CV CV 
  BSE test  GMO free  GRH free  BSE test  GMO free  CRH free 
Mean  4.01  2.42 3.33 7.41  4.44 6.01 
Median  3.68 2.33 3.31 6.79 4.01 5.90 
Mode  5.42 2.48 3.52 2.83 2.94 4.87 
SD  2.79 1.71 2.04 5.34 3.24 3.77 
Comparing beef steaks that are labeled as not being produced with GMO's with 
beef steaks that carry a guarantee for absence of growth hormones, our welfare measures 
suggest that consumers are willing to pay most to avoid risks associated with BSE: the 
average (median) CV for guaranteed tested for BSE were $7.41/kg ($6.79/kg). Further, 
when we compare the growth hormone guarantee with the GM guarantee, the CV 
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measures suggest that consumers place a higher valuation on the guarantee that the 
animals were raised without growth hormones. 
Conclusion 
This paper reports the results from an internet-based consumer survey that was 
conducted in both the US (Montana) and in Canada (Alberta) after the May 2003 BSE 
case affected meat markets in North America. The analysis focuses on an attribute-based 
repeated choice-experiment to explore consumers' valuation of beef labeling strategies on 
both sides of the border. The labeling strategies that are explored are based on three 
labeling attributes related to beef steaks: (i) beef that is guaranteed produced without 
genetically modified organisms), (ii) beef that is guaranteed raised without growth 
hormones and (iii) beef that is guaranteed tested for BSE. 
Our results suggest that perceptions of Alberta and Montana consumers towards 
the above beef steak labeling strategies are not significantly different. Using a pooled 
data set, our estimates suggest that four years after the first BSE case emerged in North 
America from an Alberta cow, consumers are willing to pay most to avoid risks 
associated with BSE (compared to risks associated with GMO's and growth hormones), 
as reflected in consumers' valuation of labels that assure consumers that beef is 
guaranteed tested for BSE. However, more educated consumers appear to value a 
guaranteed BSE tested steak less compared to less educated consumers. In contrast, more 
educated consumers seem to value beef that is guaranteed produced without genetically 
modified organisms more highly, compared to less educated consumers. Given the long 
history of the use of growth hormones in North American beef, it is not surprising that 
consumers' willingness to pay for a guarantee for BSE testing is higher compared to 
consumers' willingness to pay for a guarantee that the animals were raised without 
growth hormones.
  15 
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Figure 1. Annual beef per capita consumption in the US and Canada (kg) 
  1980 1981 1985 1986 1990 1991 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
US beef, not adjusted
a  34.7   35.9   30.7   30.2 30.0 30.7 29.5 30.0    
Can beef, not adjusted
b    39.86   38.2    33.28 31.45 30.75 30.46 31.77 30.66 31.08 31.74 
Can beef, adjusted
c    17.59   16.67   13.95 13.31 13.01 12.89 13.44 12.97 13.15 13.43 
 
Source: Statistics Canada (2007a), Davis and Lin (2005a) 
________________________________________________ 
arefers to “retail weight equivalent”, where “retail products are sold with less bone and closer trim” (Davis et al. 2005, p.5) 
bDoes not adjust for losses, such as waste and/or spoilage, in stores, households, private institutions or restaurants or losses during 
prepation.” (Statistics Canada 2006, p.24) 
crefers to boneless weight; “The data have been adjusted for retail, household, cooking and plate loss.” (Statistics Canada 2006, p.32) 
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